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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Does a state act consistently with the eighth and fourteenth 
amendments when it finds a convicted murderer competent for 
execution where he both understands the nature of the death penalty 
and the reasons he faces it?
2. Does a state’s legitimate right to enforce its criminal 
justice system override a convicted murderer's limited interest in 
refusing antipsychotic medication, thereby rendering himself 
incompetent to undergo execution?
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OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the Louisiana Supreme Court is reported at 
State V. Perry, 502 So.2d 543 (La. 1986).
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Petitioner seeks review of the judgment of the Louisiana 
Supreme Court entered on May 12, 1989, denying petitioner's 
appeal or, in the alternative, application for writ of certiorari 
to the Louisiana Supreme Court. The Louisiana Supreme Court 
denied a petition for rehearing on June 16, 1989. Petitioner's 
timely petition for writ of certiorari to this honorable Court 
was granted on March 5, 1990. The jurisdiction of this Court is 
invoked under 28 U.S.C. section 1257(a).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
This case involves the eighth and fourteenth amendments to 
the United States Constitution, and article 641 of the Louisiana
Code of Criminal Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1983 Michael Owen Perry was indicted on five counts of 
first degree murder. All five victims were members of his 
family, including his parents and a two year old nephew. A jury 
of his peers unanimously concluded that Mr. Perry was guilty as 
charged on all five counts. In view of the aggravating 
circumstances surrounding the murders, including the heinous 
manner in which they were committed, the jury unanimously 
requested that Mr. Perry be sentenced to death on each count. 
State V. Perry, 502 So,2d 543, 545-546 (La. 1986). Mr. Perry's
1
conviction and sentence are not at issue on petition before this 
Court.
Since his conviction and sentencing, Mr. Perry's competency 
to stand for execution has been called into question by Mr.
Perry’s counsel, who applied to the trial court for a sanity 
hearing. (J.A. 5.) The trial court appointed a sanity 
commission to aid it in its factual determination of Mr. Perry's 
competency for execution. (J-A. B.) Each member of the sanity 
commission diagnosed Mr. Perry as having Schizoaffective 
Disorder, a thinking disorder characterized by periodic 
delusions, loose associations, manic phases and paranoia. (J.A. 
16-18, 21, 55, 98, 145.) Mr. Perry has manifested several 
symptoms of the Disorder, including delusions, paranoia, 
incohesive thinking and auditory hallucinations. (J.A. 19-20. 
22.) For example, he exhibited disruptive behavior, 
restlessness, hallucinations of voices, and a belief that he was 
God. (J.A. 159-160.)
The trial court agreed with Dr. Cox, a sanity commission 
member, that Haldol is the most effective treatment for 
Schizoaffective Disorder. (J.A. 297.) Haldol is a commonly 
prescribed treatment used to increase the cohesiveness of the 
thinking process, reduce paranoia and aid in the patient’s 
concentration level. (J.A. 24.) Haldol "affects [Mr. Perry] 
beneficially." (J.A. 60.) The medication "[m]akes his thinking 
become more coherent and rational, it makes his delusional 
beliefs either go away or become much less compelling or
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controlling. If he's hallucinating it will suppress or cease the 
hallucinations. . . (J.A. 74.) It also makes Mr. Perry
”[l]ess hostile, less aggressive. . . . (J.A. 74.) Further,
when on Haldol, "he was able to distinguish right from wrong."
(J.A, 72.) One doctor testified that, ''[w]hen he's on medication 
I think he's competent, when he's not I don’t think he is."
(J.A. 77.)
Dr. Kovac, medical director of the Louisiana State 
Penitentiary at Angola where Mr. Perry is imprisoned, testified 
that it is in Mr. Perry's "best health" that he take Haldol.
(J.A. 224.) Dr. Jimenez, another sanity commission member, 
stated that she would "feel more comfortable if [Mr. Perry] were 
better medicated. . . (J.A. 39.) However, Mr. Perry's
defense counsel has instructed him to refuse medication. (J.A.
77, 224.)
There was conflicting testimony as to whether Mr. Perry 
experienced side effects as a result of taking Haldol. Dr. Kovac 
testified that Mr. Perry reported mild discomfort from the Haldol 
injections. Mr. Perry told her that the injections "make his hip 
burn." (J.A. 225.) Dr. Jimenez testified that Mr. Perry 
experienced stiffness and drooling, but she warned that Mr. Perry 
"exaggerated" some of the symptoms. (J.A. 24.) The trial court, 
however, accorded Dr. Cox's testimony the greatest weight and 
found that Mr. Perry experienced no side effects. (J.A. 285.)
Mr. Perry periodically exhibits psychotic symptoms even when 
he takes the medication. (J.A. 62.) However, even while
3
manifesting psychotic behavior, Mr. Perry has shown an 
understanding of both the nature of the death penalty and the 
reasons for his sentence. (J.A. 16, 30, 36, 56, 62.) He 
understands that the execution process will result in his death. 
(J.A. 62, 72, 252.) Dr. Jimenez testified that Mr. Perry 
expressed his fear of death. (J.A. 30.) Dr. Jimenez also stated 
that Mr. Perry understood he would suffer the death penalty 
because he )cilled five members of his family. (J.A. 30, 36,
265.)
The procedure at the Louisiana Department of Corrections 
allows a competent patient to make his or her own treatment 
decisions. (J.A. 60.) However, if the patient’s mental 
condition deteriorates to the point where [s]he is "gravely 
disabled," then the Department may forcibly medicate the patient. 
(J.A. 60.) In the instant case, Haldol has made Mr. Perry 
competent enough, according to Department of Corrections 
standards, to refuse medication. (J.A. 60.) However, when off 
the Haldol, Mr. Perry’s condition deteriorates quickly. (J.A. 
59.) One doctor noted that Mr. Perry makes a connection between 
his refusal to take medication and the ability to avoid 
execution: "it's very simple to understand, take my pills and 
die, don't take my pills and live. ... so, I'm not going to 
take my pills." (J.A. 224.)
After hearing the testimony of the sanity commission 
members, the state trial court judge, as fact finder, determined 
that (1) Mr. Perry is competent for purposes of execution while
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medicated; and, (2) Mr. Perry is aware of his punishment and the 
reason he is to suffer the death penalty. (J.A. 296, 298.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should explicitly adopt the competency standard 
articulated by Justice Powell and used by Louisiana. The Court 
has already implicitly embraced the standard, and the standard 
satisfies moral and philosophical concerns against executing the 
insane. Justice Powell’s competency for execution standard 
requires that the defendant understand both the nature of the 
death penalty and the reasons he has been sentenced to face it.
Ford V. Wainwriqht. 477 U.S. 399, 422 (1986) (Powell, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Two of the 
court-appointed doctors, who evaluated Mr. Perry during his 
treatment, agreed that when medicated with Haldol, Mr. Perry 
fulfills both prongs of Justice Powell’s test. (J.A. 30, 56.)
The trial court judge concurred with the opinions of the doctors: 
"[i]t is obvious to this Court that the defendant is competent 
for execution. . - . while maintained on psychotropic medication
in the form of Haldol.” (J.A. 296.)
The Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment does not 
require a higher degree of reliability than that provided for by 
Justice Powell’s standard. Ford, 477 U.S. at 429 (O’Connor and 
White, JJ., concurring in the result in part and dissenting in 
part). To require a higher standard than Justice Powell’s test 
would be to effectively eliminate the death penalty as a means of 
punishment, since more rigid guidelines for imposing the death
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penalty would place impracticable conditions on its use. Gregg 
V. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 n.50 (1976). More specifically, 
this Court should not require as part of Louisiana's competency 
standard that the defendant be able to assist counsel; the 
ability to do so is required neither by Louisiana law nor the Due 
Process Clause. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 641; Ford, 477 
U.S. at 413 (majority opinion) ("minimal degree of reliability is 
required for the protection of any constitutional interest").
The fact finder's determination that Mr. Perry is competent 
must be accorded deference where the record fairly supports the 
findings. Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U.S. Ill, 117 (1983) (per 
curiam). In addition to deferring to state courts' factual 
determinations, this Court also recognizes the limited role 
federal courts should play in applying the eighth amendment to 
states' laws. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 174 (Stewart, Powell and 
Stevens, JJ., concurring).
A policy allowing states to forcibly medicate death row 
inmates in order to make the inmates competent to undergo 
execution comports with substantive due process requirements set 
forth by this Court in Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 
1039-1040 (1990). A forcible medication policy is constitutional 
where it is; (1) reasonably related to a legitimate state 
interest; (2) a rational and effective means of furthering that 
interest; and, (3) in the inmate's medical interest. Id. There 
can be little doubt as to the legitimacy of a state's interest in 
enforcing its criminal justice system. To allow a convicted
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murderer to refuse medication, thereby rendering himself 
incompetent to face the death penalty rightfully imposed upon 
him, is to sanction the gradual erosion of respect for criminal 
law. Accordingly, the forcible medication of an incompetent 
death row inmate, where in the inmate's medical interest, is a 
rational means of furthering a state's interest in maintaining 
the integrity of its criminal justice system.
Forcible medication is not cruel and unusual punishment.
The eighth amendment prohibits "excessive" punishments. Gregg, 
428 U.S. at 173. Inquiry into "excessiveness" has two aspects: 
the punishment (1) "must not involve the unnecessary and wanton 
infliction of pain;" and, (2) "must not be grossly out of 
proportion to the crime." Id. Furthermore, this constitutional 
test "is intertwined with an assessment of contemporary standards 
and the legislative judgment weighs heavily in ascertaining such 
standards." Id. at 175. Forcible medication, where in the 
patient’s medical interest, can hardly be labelled punishment. 
However, if determined punishment, forcible medication under the 
circumstances of the present case, is not cruel and unusual by 
eighth amendment standards.
Forcibly medicating an inmate, where there are no reasonable 
alternatives, certainly is not "unnecessary and wanton."
Moreover, forcible medication is not "grossly" disproportionate 
to the crime where used to facilitate the penalty rightfully 
imposed. Finally, use of forcible medication where necessary to 
further a legitimate state interest comports with contemporary
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standards. This is evidenced by the numerous state legislatures 
which have adopted forcible medication policies under 
circumstances analogous to the instant case.
ARGUMENT
I. A COMPETENCY STANDARD THAT REQUIRES THAT DEFENDANT UNDERSTAND 
BOTH THE FACT OF HIS IMPENDING EXECUTION AND THE REASONS FOR 
IT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS.
The eighth amendment of the Constitution, which prohibits
cruel and unusual punishment, is not violated by the execution of
Mr. Perry. A punishment passes eighth amendment scrutiny when it
conforms to ‘‘evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society." Trop v. Dulles 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
Because the test under which Mr. Perry was found competent
comports with evolving standards of decency, the state trial
court's determination of his competency for execution should be
upheld.
This Court repeatedly has interpreted the eighth amendment as 
giving states the right to impose the death penalty on inmates 
convicted of capital crimes, as long as certain procedural 
reguirements are met. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 
284 (1976) (plurality opinion); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 
188-189 (1976) (plurality opinion); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 
242, 247 (1976) (plurality opinion). The amendment's prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment does, however, preclude 
states from imposing the death penalty on incompetent defendants. 
Ford V. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986) (majority opinion). 
Although this Court deems execution of insane inmates to be an
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eighth amendment violation, it has never explicitly adopted a 
constitutional standard for determining an insane prisoner's 
competency for execution. We urge this Court to expressly adopt 
Justice Powell's standard articulated in Ford, which posits that 
an inmate is competent for execution when he understands both the 
nature of the death penalty and the reasons he has been sentenced 
to face it. Id. at 422. Louisiana models its competency 
standard after Justice Powell's test.
A. Justice Powell's competency standard comports with evolving 
standards of decency because it has been implicitly adopted
by this Court and satisfies society's moral concern about
executing the insane.
This Court should find that the standard articulated by 
Justice Powell and used by Louisiana comports with evolving 
standards of decency, because the Court has already implicitly 
embraced the standard, and because the test satisfies concerns 
against executing the insane. Id. at 417, 419-421. Justice 
Powell's competency standard finds implicit support from the Ford 
majority: "[i]t is... abhorrent... to exact in penance the life 
of one whose mental illness prevents him from comprehending the 
reasons for the penalty or its implicationsId. at 417 
(emphasis added). The majority suggests that the prisoner must 
have the capacity to understand that he has been sentenced to 
death because of his crime and that he will die as a result of 
the execution of the sentence.
A plurality of this Court gave Justice Powell's test explicit 
support by citing it as the standard for determining competency 
for execution. Penry v. Lvnauah, 109 S, Ct. 2934, 2954 (1989).
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Although Penry concerned the execution of a mentally retarded 
inmate, the concern that prisoners facing execution have "the 
capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of their actions," Id., 
is identical with respect to insane inmates. The plurality’s 
citation of Powell’s standard in the context of a retarded 
defendant suggests its recognition that the standard satisfies a 
concern that the defendant understand the wrongfulness of his 
actions.
Two justices gave further support for Justice Powell’s 
competency standard. Justices Marshall and Brennan repeated the 
standard under facts identical to the present case, in which the 
issue of competency for execution was raised after conviction and 
sentencing. Johnson v. Cabana, 481 U.S. 1061, 1061“1062 (1987) 
(Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari). Because this Court has repeatedly cited Justice 
Powell’s test with approval, we urge this Court to explicitly 
adopt it as a minimum standard for determining an inmate's 
competency for execution.
Justice Powell’s competency standard comports with prevailing 
standards of decency because it allays moral and philosophical 
concerns about inadvertently executing the insane. Ford, 477 
U.S. at 422. The eighth amendment prohibition against executing 
incompetent inmates derives from two modern social concerns. 
First, society is interested in allowing a condemned prisoner to 
prepare for his death spiritually and emotionally. Secondly, 
limiting use of the death penalty to sane prisoners preserves
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retribution, a critical justification for the death penalty. Id. 
at 421. By requiring that the inmate understand the implications 
of the death penalty, the standard satisfies society's concern 
that the defendant have the capacity to prepare for his death, 
both emotionally and spiritually. Secondly, the standard 
fulfills a crucial purpose for the state's imposition of the 
death penalty, retribution, by ensuring that the prisoner 
understand that the purpose of the sentence is punishment for his 
crimes. Id.
B. The defendant in this case meets the requirements of
Justice Powell's competency standard.
The court-appointed doctors who evaluated Mr, Perry during 
treatment agreed that when treated with Haldol, Mr. Perry 
fulfills both prongs of Justice Powell's test. With respect to 
the first prong of the standard, comprehension of the finality of 
the death penalty, Mr. Perry demonstrated his understanding on 
several occasions. For instance, he expressed to Dr. Jimenez 
that he does not want to die. (J.A. 30.) Furthermore, he has 
repeatedly expressed an awareness that he could be killed by 
electrocution: "I directly asked him if electrocution would kill 
him and he said yes, he knew it would." (J.A. 252; see also J.A. 
72.)
Regarding the second prong of Justice Powell's test, Mr. Perry 
has repeatedly demonstrated his awareness of the reasons for his 
punishment. Doctors Jimenez, and Cox both testified that he 
comprehends the correlation between the murders he committed and 
the sentence imposed for them. (J.A, 30, 56.) In graphic
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illustration of such understanding, Mr. Perry compared his own 
sentence for murder to Charles Manson's: "he was questioning the 
fact as to why Charles Manson had people killed, or killed some 
people, and he was not being executed and why, why (Perry], who 
killed five people should be executed." (J.A. 265.)
Furthermore, he demonstrated a capacity to distinguish right from 
wrong. (J.A. 72.) The trial court agreed with Drs. Cox and 
Jimenez and found that, "it is obvious to this Court that the 
defendant is competent for execution. . . . while maintained on
psychotropic medication in the form of Haldol." (J.A. 296.)
C. Requiring a higher standard to determine competency than
Justice Powell's two-pronged test would encourage false
claims, waste judicial and government resources, and is
required neither by Louisiana law nor the Due Process
Clause.
The Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment does not 
require a higher degree of reliability than that provided for in 
Justice Powell's standard, in light of the unique lack of 
finality that attends the issue of competency. As Justices 
O'Connor and White expressed, "[b]y definition, this interest [in 
suspending the death penalty during incompetency] can never be 
conclusively and finally determined. Regardless of the number of 
prior adjudications of the issue, until the very moment of 
execution the prisoner can claim that he has become insane 
sometime after the previous determination to the contrary."
Ford, 477 U.S. at 429 (emphasis in original).
Additionally, to require a higher standard than Justice 
Powell's test would be to effectively eliminate the death penalty
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as a means of punishment, since more rigid guidelines for
imposing the death penalty would place impracticable conditions
on its use. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199 n.50. States have several
compelling interests at stake that would be thwarted by a higher
competency standard. First, states have a compelling interest in
upholding their justice systems and executing the sentence of a
prisoner properly condemned. Ford, 477 U.S. at 425. A higher
standard would only thwart the state’s interest and cause a
proliferation of false claims and delay tactics. Id. at 429. In
spite of the theoretically limited due process rights accorded to
post-conviction inmates. Id., the state’s criminal justice
system, prosecutorial and judicial resources would be at the
mercy of inmates’ groundless claims of incompetency.
Furthermore, states have a legitimate interest in preserving
judicial and governmental resources:
a standard that focused on the defendant’s ability to 
assist in his defense would give too little weight to 
the State's interest in finality, since it implies a 
constitutional right to raise new challenges to one’s 
criminal conviction until a sentence has run its course 
.... States have a strong and legitimate interest in 
avoiding repetitive collateral review through 
procedural bars.
Id. at 421 n.2. Accordingly, a higher standard of 
competency than Justice Powell's test should not be required 
because of both the lack of finality that attends competency 
determinations, and the enormous risk of false claims.
This Court should not require as part of Louisiana's 
competency standard that the defendant be able to assist counsel, 
because the ability to do so is neither required by Louisiana law
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nor the Due Process Clause. Louisiana requires that a defendant 
have the ability to assist counsel in his defense. LA. CODE 
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 641. The Court should not expand the plain 
language of the statute to require the defendant’s post­
conviction ability to assist counsel. This Court has held that 
where a statute mandates, in "language of an unmistakable 
mandatory character,*' that the state will act against an 
individual’s interests only if "specified substantive predicates" 
are satisfied, procedural due process requires that such 
"predicates" be enforced. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471-472 
(1983). Here, by contrast, the plain language of the statute in 
question does not require the ability to assist counsel at post­
conviction hearings; it merely prescribes that the defendant be 
able to assist in his own defense, ie., at trial.
Furthermore, the Due Process Clause does not require the 
ability to assist counsel after conviction, because to do so 
would surpass the minimal reliability requirements of procedural 
due process. A mere "minimal degree of reliability [is] required 
for the protection of any constitutional interest." Ford, 477 
U.S. at 413. The procedural safeguards that Louisiana uses in 
its competency evaluation process ensure that reliability is 
achieved.
Louisiana's procedural safeguards clearly surpass the minimal 
procedural requirements enumerated by Ford. In Ford, the 
majority focused on the defendant's lack of opportunity to submit 
written material relevant to the issue of his sanity, cross-
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examine the psychiatrists who evaluated him, and have the issue 
determined by a court, as the reasons that defendant was denied 
procedural due process. Id. at 413-416. Here, in contrast, the 
trial court allowed Mr. Perry’s counsel to submit all relevant 
written evidence and cross-examine the psychiatrists; further, 
the determination of competency was made by a judge. Therefore, 
by satisfying the due process concerns articulated in Ford, 
Louisiana's application of Justice Powell's standard satisfies 
due process without requiring the ability to assist counsel at a 
competency hearing.
Finally, the ability to assist counsel should not be required 
because the rationale for requiring that defendant have such 
ability, that he may have knowledge of information that could 
exonerate him or lighten his sentence, is not applicable here.
Id. at 419-420. This rationale applies only to the guilt­
determining and sentencing phases, not with post-conviction 
competency proceedings, where guilt is not at issue.
Mr. Perry's counsel represented him competently at a Louisiana 
trial court hearing on the issue of his competency. He exercised 
his right to appeal to the Louisiana Supreme Court the trial 
court's ruling declaring him competent. Thus, Mr. Perry's 
representation by competent counsel at his several levels of 
judicial review have ensured that, "[ijt is thus unlikely indeed 
that a defendant today could go to his death with knowledge of 
undiscovered trial error that might set him free." Id. at 420. 
Accordingly, this Court should not require that the defendant
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possess the ability to assist counsel, because the traditional 
rationale for requiring such ability is inapplicable to the 
present stage of proceedings.
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Perry need not have the ability 
to assist counsel. However, even if this Court were to 
establish such a requirement, Mr. Perry would satisfy it. Dr. 
Cox, of the sanity commission, and Dr. Kovac, the prison medical 
director, both testified that Mr. Perry refused to take his 
prescribed medication at the advice of his attorney. (J.A. 77, 
224.) He did so even though Haldol is in his "best health."
(J.A. 224.) By refusing to take his medication, he understands 
that he is following the advice of his counsel and avoiding the 
sentence rightfully imposed upon him: "it’s very simple to 
understand, take my pills and die, don't take my pills and live.
. . so. I'm not going to take my pills," (J.A. 224.) Thus, Mr. 
Perry possesses the ability to assist in his counsel’s strategy 
for avoiding punishment.
D. This Court owes deference to both the factual conclusions 
of the trial court and the legal standard adopted by 
Louisiana.
The state trial court's determination that Mr. Perry was 
competent must be accorded deference by federal courts where the 
record fairly supports the trial court's findings. Maqgio v. 
Fulford, 462 U.S. Ill, 117 (1983) (per curiam). In Maggio. this 
Court reversed a federal court of appeals' decision to overturn a 
Louisiana trial court ruling that defendant was competent to 
stand trial. Id. at 112-113. The Court reasoned that the issue
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of competency is a factual conclusion that may only be overturned 
when the factual determination is not "fairly" supported by the 
record. id. at 117. Here, as in Maggio, the trial court's 
^®^6rmination that Mr. Perry is competent for execution must be 
accorded the deference owed to a factual conclusion. The court- 
appointed doctors' repeated conclusions that Mr. Perry is 
competent for execution under Justice Powell's standard gave the 
Louisiana trial court more than ample support for its finding 
that Mr. Perry is competent. (J.A. 30, 56.) Accordingly, this 
Court should defer to and affirm the Louisiana trial court's 
factual determination.
In addition to deferring to state courts' factual 
determinations, this Court also recognizes the limited role the 
federal courts should play in applying the eighth amendment to 
states* laws. Gregg. 428 U.S. at 174. In Gregg, the Court 
upheld a Georgia statute's procedural scheme for imposing or 
withholding the death penalty at the sentencing phase of trial.
Id. at 207. Three concurring justices reasoned that, "while we 
have an obligation to insure that constitutional bounds are not 
overreached, . . . the independence of the judiciary is 
jeopardized when courts become embroiled in the passions of the 
day and assume primary responsibility in choosing between 
competing political, economic and social pressures." Id. at 174- 
175 (quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951) 
(Fran)cfurter, J., concurring in affirmance of judgment)). In 
evaluating the constitutionality of Louisiana's competency
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standard, this Court should apply Gregg because of its factual 
similarity; in both cases the states' schemes for determining 
whether to withhold the death penalty are mere procedural devices 
that deserve deference by this Court. If the Court were to 
choose a competency test based on its own standard of decency, it 
would become embroiled in a classic "social pressure" warned 
against by Gregg; "[c]aution is necessary lest this Court become 
. . . the ultimate arbiter of the standards of criminal 
responsibility . . . throughout the country." Id. at 176
(quoting Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 533 (1968)).
Accordingly, this Court should defer to Louisiana's scheme for 
the policy reasons articulated in Gregg.
II. ALLOWING A STATE TO FORCIBLY MEDICATE A CONVICTED MURDERER 
WITH ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS IN ORDER TO MAKE HIM COMPETENT TO 
UNDERGO EXECUTION MEETS FOURTEENTH AND EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
REQUIREMENTS.
A. The forcible medication of a convicted prisoner comports
with substantive due process where it (1) is reasonably
related to a state's legitimate interest; (2) is a 
rational means of furthering that interest; and, (3) is _in 
the inmate's medical interest.
A state has a substantial and legitimate interest in executing 
a death sentence imposed upon a convicted murderer by the state’s 
jury. Ford, 477 U.S. at 425. To allow a death row inmate to 
refuse antipsychotic treatment, thereby rendering himself 
incompetent to undergo execution, is to deny a state the power to 
enforce its criminal justice system. We urge this Court to give 
states this right of enforcement by affording them the means of 
forcible medication to ma}ce death row inmates competent to face 
their sentences.
18
This is a case of forcibly medicating a condemned prisoner 
to further a legitimate state interest. Recently, this Court 
addressed an analogous situation in Washington v. Harper, 110 S. 
Ct. 1028 (1990). involved the forcible medication of
violent prisoners in order to ensure prison safety. In Harper, 
this Court set forth the standard for determining whether 
forcible medication comports with substantive due process. That 
standard is whether the forcible medication: (1) reasonably 
relates to a legitimate state interest; (2) is a rational means 
of furthering that interest; and, (3) is in the inmate's medical 
interest. Id^ at 1037.
Under that standard, this Court determined that Washington's 
policy of forcibly medicating prisoners who endanger prison 
safety comports with substantive due process requirements. Id. 
at 1039-1040. This Court found that forcibly medicating a 
violent prisoner "reasonably related to the State's legitimate 
interest in combating the danger posed by a violent, mentally ill 
inmate. . . . [and was] a rational means of furthering that 
interest." Id. at 1031. Furthermore, Washington's policy 
allowed forcible medication only where in the violent inmate's 
medical interest. Id. at 1040.
We urge this Court to adopt the Harper standard in 
evaluating the constitutionality of Louisiana’s proposed policy 
of forcibly medicating an incompetent death row inmate to achieve 
the inmate’s competency for purposes of execution. Like the 
state of Washington, Louisiana aims to use forcible medication as
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a rational means of furthering a legitimate state interest: 
Louisiana seeks to forcibly medicate Mr. Perry, a convicted 
murderer, in order to carry out the sentence validly imposed upon
him by a jury of the state.
1. A state has a legitimate interest in enforcing its 
criminal justice system.
There can be little doubt as to the legitimacy and importance 
of a state’s interest in executing the sentences imposed by its 
juries. In Ford, this Court passed on the issue of whether 
Florida could enforce the death penalty against a convicted 
murderer who had become insane subsequent to sentencing. Justice 
Powell acknowledged that Florida had "a substantial and 
legitimate interest in taking petitioner's life as punishment for 
his crime." Ford. 477 U.S. at 425. In the present case, 
Louisiana has a significant interest in executing the sentence 
imposed upon Mr. Perry in order to maintain the integrity of its 
criminal justice system and the faith of its citizens in that 
system. To permit Mr. Perry, a convicted murderer, to avoid the 
sentence validly imposed upon him by a Louisiana jury, is to 
sanction the gradual erosion of respect for Louisiana criminal
law.
2. Forcibly medicating an inmate with antipsychotic
drugs is a rational means of achieving the inmate s 
competency to undergo execution.
The forcible medication of a death row inmate with 
antipsychotic drugs is a rational means of making the inmate 
competent to undergo execution. Antipsychotic medications are 
proven to be an effective means of treating and controlling
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psychiatric disorders and aiding in an affected patient's 
competency. (J.A. 297.) Haldol, a commonly prescribed 
antipsychotic drug, increases the cohesiveness of the thin)cing 
process, reduces paranoia and aids in concentration level. (J.A. 
24. )
In the instant case, forcible medication of Mr. Perry is not 
just a rational means of carrying out the sentence imposed upon 
him, it is the only means. As one doctor testified. *'[w]hen [Mr. 
Perry) is on medication he's competent, when he's not I don t 
think he is." (J.A. 77.) More compellingly, Mr. Perry himself 
comprehends that in refusing treatment he is effectively avoiding 
his sentence. In an interview with one of his doctors, Mr. Perry 
stated, "It's very simple to understand, take my pills and die, 
don't take my pills and live. . . so, I'm not going to take my 
pills." (J.A. 224.)
3. Forcibly medicating Mr. Perry with antipsychotic 
drugs is in his medical interest.
The trial court found that treatment with Haldol is 
appropriate for Mr. Perry's disorder, and that such treatment 
affects him beneficially. (J.A. 297, 24.) Haldol makes Mr.
Perry more coherent and rational; on Haldol, his thinking process 
becomes less delusional and more cohesive. (J.A. 72, 74.) In 
sum, Haldol aids in Mr. Perry's well-being.
Mr. Perry is not presently taking Haldol, at the advice of his 
attorney, not his doctors. (J.A. 76, 77, 261.) In fact, Mr, 
Perry's doctors have suggested that they would "feel more 
comfortable" if he were better medicated, and that the medication
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is in Mr. Perry’s "best health." (J.A. 39, 224.) Clearly, 
treatment with Haldol is in Mr. Perry’s medical interest.
The above analysis indicates that Louisiana’s forcible 
medication of Mr. Perry, to achieve his competency to undergo 
execution, comports with the due process requirements set forth 
by this Court in Harper. Forcibly medicating Mr. Perry with 
Haldol is in Mr. Perry’s medical interest. Moreover, the 
forcible medication of Mr. Perry, a convicted murderer: (1) is 
reasonably related to Louisiana's legitimate and important 
interest in enforcing its criminal justice system; and, (2) is 
the only effective means of carrying out the penalty rightfully 
imposed upon Mr. Perry.
In conclusion, this case affords this Court the opportunity to 
empower states to enforce their criminal justice systems. We 
urge this Court to allow states to use forcible medication to 
make death row inmates competent to face their rightfully imposed 
sentences.
B. Mr. Perry’s due process interest in refusing
antipsychotic medication is limited by his position as a
convicted and sentenced murderer.
As stated by Justice O’Connor in Ford, "once society has 
validly convicted an individual of a crime and therefore 
established its right to punish, the demands of due process are 
reduced accordingly.’’ Ford. 477 U.S. 429. Mr. Perry was 
rightfully convicted on five counts of murder and subsequently 
sentenced to the death penalty. State v. Perry, 502 So.2d 543, 
545-546 (La. 1986). Thus, Mr. Perry's due process interests are
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substantially diminished.
The due process interest of an accused in refusing forcible 
medication with antipsychotic drugs is addressed in United States 
V. Charters, 829 F,2d 479 (4th Cir. 1987). The Charters Court 
implied that a pre-trial accused, still surrounded by a 
presumption of innocence, is afforded greater liberty interests 
than a convicted inmate in avoiding forcible medication. The 
Charters Court explicitly stated that it was only addressing "the 
circumstances of the unconvicted defendant and express[ed] no 
views concerning the rights of convicted prisoners. ..." 
at 499 n.30.
In Harper, this Court recognized that "the extent of a 
prisoner’s right under the [Due Process] Clause to avoid the 
unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs must be defined in 
the context of the inmate's confinement." Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 
1037. Mr. Harper's interest in refusing antipsychotic treatment 
was limited by the fact that, when not medicated, he engaged in 
violent conduct and endangered prison safety. In the instant 
case, Mr. Perry becomes incompetent to face his sentence when not 
medicated. (J.A. 77.) Accordingly, the Court must evaluate Mr. 
Perry's interest in refusing medication so as to prevent Mr.
Perry from thwarting the punishment rightfully imposed upon him. 
To allow Mr. Perry to refuse medication is to ma)ce Mr. Perry the 
final and sole arbiter of his sentence.
Unli)ce the pre-trial accused in Charters, Mr. Perry is no 
longer protected by a presumption of innocence. Mr. Perry is a
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convicted murderer who was unanimously sentenced to death. Like 
the convicted prisoner in Harper, whose limited liberty interests 
were further diminished where he threatened prison safety, Mr. 
Perry's limited due process interest must also be reduced in view 
of his status as a condemned prisoner. Mr. Perry must not be 
afforded the right to refuse antipsychotic treatment where 
avoidance of medication would allow total usurpation of the 
sentence imposed upon him.
C. Forcible treatment with ^antipsychotic medication is not 
cruel_ and unusual punishment .bec_ausa_ it _(_1J is not
excessive; and,_(2) comports with evolving standards o_f
decency.
As established above, forcible treatment of Mr. Perry with 
antipsychotic drugs is in his medical interest. Thus, forcible 
medication with Haldol is treatment, not punishment. However, if 
forcible medication is determined punishment under the instant 
circumstances, it by no means violates eighth amendment standards 
of cruel and unusual punishment.
The eighth amendment prohibits "excessive” punishments.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173. Inquiry into "excessiveness" has two 
aspects: the punishment (1) "must not involve the unnecessary and 
infliction of pain;" and, (2) "must not be grossly out proportion 
to the crime.” Id. Furthermore, this test "is intertwined with 
an assessment of contemporary standards. . . ." Id. at 175.
Forcibly medicating Mr. Perry with Haldol does not involve 
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. It is necessary 
because, as found by the trial court, -Haldol is the only 
effective treatment for Mr. Perry— there is no reasonable
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alternative. (J.A. 297.) It is not wanton because Mr. Perry 
reports only inild discomfort from the actual injection of Haldol. 
(J.A. 225.) Further, as found by the trial court, Mr. Perry does 
not suffer any side effects from ta)cing Haldol. (J.A. 285.)
Based upon the foregoing, it is very difficult to conclude that 
forcible administration of Haldol is a wanton and unnecessary 
infliction of pain. Furthermore, forcibly medicating Mr. Perry 
is not "grossly” disproportionate to the crime of murder where it 
is used merely to achieve Mr. Perry's competence to face the 
sentence rightfully imposed upon him.
Forcible medication of Mr. Perry comports with contemporary 
standards of decency. In his concurring opinion in Ford, Justice 
Powell provides that "the modern practices of the States . . . 
are indicative of our ‘evolving standards of decency.'" Ford,
477 U.S. at 419. This Court in Gregg posits: "legislative 
judgment weighs heavily in ascertaining such standards." Gregg, 
428 U.S. at 175. Thirty-two of the thirty-eight states which 
provide statutory schemes concerning the "right to refuse 
medication" permit forcible medication under varied 
circumstances. (J.A. 309-314.) The legislative judgment of this 
overwhelming majority of states compels the conclusion that 
forcible medication comports with contemporary standards of 
decency.
This Court recently upheld a state's right to forcibly 
medicate to further a legitimate state interest. Harper. 110 S. 
Ct. at 1039-1040 (forcible medication of prisoner in the interest
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of safety). Numerous lower courts also have sanctioned the use 
of forcible medication under a variety of circumstances, Rennie 
V. Klein, 653 F,2d 836 (1980) (forcible medication of mental 
patient where patient is a danger to self and others); Osgood v. 
District of Columbia, 567 F. Supp. 1026 (1983) (forcible 
medication of jail inmate to protect safety of others); State v. 
Kaysen, 464 So.2d 793 (La. Ct. App. 1985), State v. Hampton, 218 
So.2d 311 (La. 1969), State v. Plaisance, 211 So.2d 323 (La.
1968) (competency to stand trial achieved through use of 
prescribed medication). Clearly, forcible medication comports 
with contemporary standards of decency where used to further a 
legitimate state interest.
CONCLUSION
This case presents an opportunity for this Court to explicitly 
adopt Justice Powell's competency standard, requiring that the 
defendant understand both the fact of his impending death and the 
reasons for it. The Court has already adopted this standard in 
several recent decisions. It is a fair standard because it 
allays moral and philosophical concerns against a state executing 
an insane inmate. Mr. Perry demonstrates that he fulfills both 
prongs of Justice Powell's test. For example, Mr. Perry has 
expressed that he does not want to die. Further, Mr. Perry 
comprehends that he will be executed for the murders he 
committed. A higher test would only encourage a barrage of false 
claims of insanity.
Furthermore, the forcible medication of a convicted murderer
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to achieve competency to undergo execution is consistent with the 
Due Process Clause, in view of a state's legitimate interest in 
enforcing its criminal justice system. Allowing a condemed 
prisoner to avoid his lawful punishment by refusing antipsychotic 
treatment would allow the prisoner to thwart the state's 
legitimate interest. Such a result clearly must not be intended 
limited due process rights after conviction. Moreover, forcible 
medication, under the present circumstances, is consistent with 
the eighth amendment because (1) it is the only effective 
treatment, from Haldol. Its comportment with evolving standards 
of decency is demonstrated by the number of statutory schemes 
adopting forcible medication, as well as the several cases 
upholding such schemes.
For the foregoing reasons, we urge this Court to uphold the 
Louisiana Supreme Court's holding that: (1) the state may 
forcibly medicate Mr. Perry for purposes of execution; and, (2) 
the proper test to determine competency for execution is that the 
defendant understand the nature of the death penalty and the 
reason for it.
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Dated: October 25, 1990.
Respectfully submitted,
